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TEACHING ANTI-CORRUPTION IN THE CAUCASUS  
AND BLACK SEA REGION(S)
There is hardly a topic in the current transformations that is as central as corruption. Anti-corruption 
efforts go back to the nineties when globalisation turned the world into a corporate playing field. Since 
then, a wealth of tools and instruments has been invented, and any student of anti-corruption can be 
certain to find abundant materials. From a teacher’s perspective, turning these materials into a coherent 
academic subject is the first challenge.
But anti-corruption is not a subject like any other. If taught properly, it should challenge every 
student’s moral compass and become a catalyst for the development of professional ethics. Anybody 
who has ever been forced to pay bribes in a university setting will remember «turning red with shame».1 
Bribing your teacher, as compared to a traffic police or customs officer, seems like the ultimate betrayal 
of the notion of the intellectual community between scholar/teacher and student, and it throws into doubt 
the entire system of values and goals that higher education stands for. In its effect, it is as pernicious as 
doping in sports. And when the shame is overcome, the result will be a graduate who is «street-wise», who 
is ready to play the game and expect nothing less from his or her colleagues.2
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is twofold. It serves as a reflection on the 
state of anti-corruption efforts in the Black Sea and Caucasus region(s)3 and suggests a model how 
electronic resources could become a catalyst in bringing blended learning/teaching on anti-corruption 
to the region(s). At the same time, it develops the scholarly argument that the «toolkit box approach» 
favoured by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is not sufficient to address 
the root causes of corruption in the region(s). As an alternative and to the extent that it concerns the 
1  Iuliia Mendel, In Ukraine’s Universities, Trading Bribes for Diplomas, available at <http://
www.politico.eu/article/trading-bribes-for-diplomas-in-ukraines-universities-taxes-transparency-
education-corruption/>.
2  See Elena Denisova-Schmidt, Martin Huber and Elvira Leontyeva, On the Development of Students‘ 
Attitudes towards Corruption and Cheating in Russian Universities, Université de Fribourg Working 
Paper Series Nr. 467 (II.2016).
3  The reason of speaking not of one region is that there is neither a clear Black Sea regional identity 
nor a distinct Caucasus regional identity. It is probably pointless to argue about specific affiliations 
of individual countries, as the problems are largely overlapping.
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Black Sea and Caucasus region(s), it is suggested to place anti-corruption more firmly into the context 
of Europeanisation as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership 
(EaP), in particular. As such, it should be integrally linked to the support of civil society, independent 
media, independence and integrity of the judiciary, and open government.
Keywords: teaching anti-corruption; civil society; professional ethic; European Neighbourhood 
Policy; Eastern Partnership.
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Вопросы антикоррупционного обучения в Кавказском и Черноморском регионах
Рассмотрены вопросы организации антикоррупционного обучения в государствах Черномор-
ского и Кавказского регионов. Аргументировано, что использование в этих целях электронных 
ресурсов, в частности метода «универсальной инструментальной системы», одобренного Офи-
сом ООН по борьбе с наркотиками и преступностью, недостаточно для искоренения причин 
коррупции в этих регионах. В качестве альтернативы предложено интенсифицировать анти-
коррупционное образование в контексте Европейской политики добрососедства и, в частности, 
Восточного партнерства. Это предполагает обязательную поддержку со стороны гражданского 
общества, независимых средств массовой информации, а также независимости и взаимодействия 
судебных и правительственных органов.
Ключевые слова: антикоррупционное обучение; гражданское общество; профессиональная 
этика; открытое правительство; Европейская политика добрососедства.
Taking stock of anti-corruption efforts in the Wider Europe. Comparing the 
Black Sea and Caucasus region(s) to the Western Balkans1 as the other pre-eminent 
theatre of Europeanisation, there is a marked difference in the level achieved and, 
in particular, in the prevalence of regional anti-corruption initiatives. In the Black 
Sea and Caucasus region(s) there is no network of law schools and law faculties 
committed to fighting corruption.2 Likewise, there is no regional anti-corruption 
initiative similar to the Regional Anti-corruption Initiative (RAI) created in 2007 
as a follow up to the Stability Pact Anti-corruption Initiative.3 The latter, among 
other things, set out to establish a Framework for Integrated Anti-Corruption Legal 
Education in the region.4
When it comes to inter-regional associations, the record is likewise mixed. 
The European Partners against Corruption (EPAC) and the European Contact-
1  Inter-regional comparisons in Europeanisation studies are still rare. See e.g. Thomas Kruessmann 
(ed.), Moving beyond the ‘Kosovo Precedence’. EU Integration for Moldova and the South Caucasus, 
LIT Verlag: Zurich 2015.
2  Compare, for instance, the well-developed South East European Law School Network (SEELS) at 
<http://www.seelawschool.org>.
3  As for the Black Sea region, Bulgaria, Moldova and Romania are members of RAI. 
4  To achieve this goal, in 2012 a South East European Judicial Training Network (SEEJTN) was 
established. Compared to this phase # 1, a phase # 2 was envisioned to create a common platform 
between SEELS and SEEJTN as a way to developing learning information tools. See <http://
rai-see.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Establishment_of_Framework_for_IntegratedAC_Legal_
Education_in_SEE-Project_Overview.pdf>. It is unclear, however, at which stage of realisation this 
project is.
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Point Network against Corruption (EACN)1 are solidly represented in the Western 
Balkans. Their presence in the Black Sea region is much less pronounced,2 and in the 
Caucasus only Azerbaijan is a member. By comparison, the International Association 
of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA) has a more balanced geographical reach 
and includes also the Black Sea and Caucasus region(s).3 
Looking at individual countries in the Black Sea and Caucasus region(s), 
individual law curriculums typically do not provide for teaching the subject of anti-
corruption. The criminalisation of bribery is usually covered in advanced criminal 
law classes, while administrative and civil sanctions are usually not covered at all. 
Issues of enforcement partly fall into criminal procedure classes. Alternative models, 
esp. the creation of anti-corruption agencies, may be treated in administrative law. 
Compliance issues and the rights and obligations of employees of corporations do fall 
at best into labour law classes, but there is no coherent treatment of anti-corruption 
compliance in the private sector. Other disciplines like Global Studies offer a 
comparative perspective on approaches adopted in a large number of countries. 
Economics may present and challenge some of the behavioural underpinnings of 
corrupt behaviour, and Business Studies may reflect on suitable corporate structures 
to avoid managerial liability.
All in all, in the Black Sea and Caucasus region(s) by the year 2017 we (still) 
do not see a coherent treatment of anti-corruption as an academic discipline. And 
the incentives to do so may not be overwhelmingly strong, either. Indeed, as long as 
university rectorates need to rely on a few faculties, esp. law faculties, as «cash cows» 
for their budgets, there can be no sizable fail rates in the large group of students 
known as kontraktniki, i.e. those who pay for their education themselves. So there 
is often a tacit acknowledgement that integrity standards need to remain «flexible» 
in order to accomodate the special wishes and needs of those who are paying large 
tuition fees. This, of course, does not preclude the introduction of anti-corruption 
as a discipline, but it makes it harder to justify the real-life concessions which seem 
unavoidable. 
In this situation, can extra-curricular activities like massive open online courses 
(MOOCs), seasonal schools or ad hoc planned seminars by outside lecturers make a 
difference? Similar to the task of squaring the circle, there are a number of barriers 
to overcome.
• The lecturer of the class should not be part of the traditional faculty. He or 
she should be outside of the networks of favours, career expectations and dependen-
cies. Still, inviting «fly-in» faculty to teach the subject of anti-corruption is costly.
• In order to obtain sizable (ETCS) credits, there should be a normal workload 
for every student. Still, students are overtasked with their regular classes and will 
have no motivation to spend even more time for a class that is not strictly required 
to achieve their diploma.
1  See <www.epac-eacn.org>.
2  Members are Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine.
3  See <www.iaaca.org>.
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• Students from countries with a high level of corruption and years of anti-cor-
ruption propaganda will not expect that a new class will be any different than the 
window-dressing they have seen. 
Breaking through these multiple barriers is surely not an easy task. It will 
probably take committed teachers to stand up against the multitude of difficulties 
and present anti-corruption as an involving subject. Beyond the subjective factor, 
the EU itself should present grounds for a dedicated approach in anti-corruption. 
While the EU had for a decade or so practiced a double-standard in preaching 
anti-corruption abroad while leaving its Member States a free hand outside the 
realm of the protection of the Community’s financial interests, in 2015 and 2016 
the dynamics seem to have come around full circle to formulating a unitary val-
ue-based message. Not only were the Association Agreements concluded with 
Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia consistent in their anti-corruption message. The 
EU Commission in its ENP Review also emphasised stabilisation and economic 
growth along with public administration reform as key goals1 – and all included, of 
course, vigorous anti-corruption measures. Corruption is among the «EU crimes» 
for which the Lisbon Treaty gave the EU a legislative competence to determine 
minimum requirements,2 and it is intimately linked to the realisation of the funda-
mental freedoms for which ancillary criminal competences are now provided.3 The 
same position is reflected in the European Agenda on Security.4 While wide-spread 
anti-corruption demonstrations and civil society activity in Romania underscored 
this new anti-corruption drive, the EU Commission in early February 2017 sur-
prisingly took a step back when it announced that the Second EU Anti-Corruption 
Report which was scheduled for 2016 and which had become overdue by then, 
would be scrapped.5
Looking at all these developments it is clear that promoting an agenda of 
anti-corruption teaching in the Black Sea and Caucasus region(s) is a call of the 
time. Still, the ubiquity of anti-corruption rhetorics makes it difficult to break 
through the «glass walls» of student expectations. Designing a class format that will 
address these concerns is a difficult task.
1  Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions „Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy“ of 
18 November 2015, JOIN(2015) 50 final. 
2  Art 83 (1) TFEU.
3  Art 83 (2) TFEU.
4  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions „The European Agenda on 
Security“ of 28 April 2015, COM(2015) 185 final.
5  See <https://euobserver.com/institutional/136775> and <https://transparency.eu/ac-report-
shelved/>.
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Is corruption different in the Caucasus and the Black Sea region(s)?
«Fighting corruption is like fishing on Discovery Channel: catch, show and release.»1 
This joke which recently circulated on Facebook captures some of the specifics 
of (anti-) corruption in the Russian-speaking world (including the Caucasus) that 
would not normally come to the mind of a Western expert. It points to the idea 
that the way corruption is defined and understood is a function of the need to show 
some result of fighting it. «Catching», «showing» and «releasing» have all their own 
logic and rationale. Therefore, the construction of corruption and the appearance of 
fighting it go hand in hand. 
In terms of academic approaches, the aforementioned pun is reflected in a school 
of analysis that looks to the social construction of corruption with its roots in social-
ist traditions, post-socialist transitions and the formation of social capital.2 From this 
perspective, every country is unique and deserves to be treated on its own. In other 
words, what is «fish», what is «catch» and why a certain catch gets to be «shown» 
and then «released» is basically open to definition. I will come back to this approach 
in the latter part of this chapter. 
By comparison, there is an approach that starts from a unitary definition of 
corruption3 and traces its perception over time.4 Looking at Transparency Interna-
tional’s (TI’s) latest Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for the year 2016, we find 
Georgia as the frontrunner among the countries of the Caucasus region with the low-
est perception of corruption in the public sphere, now ranking at # 44. Turkey is at # 
75, Armenia at # 113, Moldova and Azerbaijan at # 123 and the Russian Federation 
and Ukraine at # 131. While not disputing the accuracy of these observations, it is 
now widely agreed that a perceptions-based ranking alone is inherently problematic. 
Since the early days of the Rose Revolution, Georgia has made waves by rigor-
ously suppressing petty corruption in the public sphere and being the first country 
to systematically use new technologies like e-government to minimise the scope of 
situations in which citizens might be asked to pay for the «facilitation» of services. 
In fact, the World Bank has had a large stake in the reforms and used its positive 
outcome to propagate the approaches it had supported. Thus, Georgia became the 
poster boy of a successful anti-corruption policy, and the more self-congratulating 
1  „Борьба с коррупцией – это как рыбалка на канале Discovery: поймали, показали, отпустили.“ 
(author unknown).
2  See, for instance, Dirk Tänzler / Konstadinos Maras / Angelos Giannakopoulos, The Social 
Construction of Corruption in Europe, Ashgate 2012; Diana Schmidt-Pfister / Holger Moroff (eds.), 
Fighting Corruption in Eastern Europe. A Multi-level Perspective, Routledge: 2013. See also the 
final report of the FP 6 „Crime and Culture“ project led by the University of Konstanz, available at 
<http://cordis.europa.eu/docs/publications/1224/122489391-6_en.pdf>.
3  By all means, the definition most commonly used today is the one that became popular through 
Transparency International (TI): „Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain“.
4  Most prominent in this respect is, of course, the annual TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 
available at <http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview>.
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publications appeared1 the firmer the perception took root that indeed the struggle 
against corruption in Georgia has been led vigorously and successfully. The problem 
with focusing on petty corruption in the public sphere is that grand corruption in 
politics, primarily in the form of nepotism and trading in influence, become widely 
disregarded. This is true especially for the controversial role of Bidzina Ivanishvili 
as the puppet master of the Georgian Dream coalition and his Kartu Foundation as 
a reservoir of «Georgian Dream» cadres that takes up positions in the entire coun-
try. Another area that is systematically neglected is corruption in the private sector 
which is dominated by closely-knit male networks.
Turkey’s record in anti-corruption will surely need to be re-written, as President 
Erdogan’s counter-putsch systematically attacks independent media known for their 
coverage of corruption issues, including investigations against the sons of President 
Erdogan in the 2013 «gas for gold» scandal. The judiciary which has never been 
fiercely independent in the first place is now suspected of being undermined by 
Gьlen forces, and it remains to be seen how effectively civil society will be able to 
work in the future.
In terms of perception, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation are 
more or less in one group of countries. But the differences are stark. In Russia, if it 
wasn’t for Alexey Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation,2 there is hardly an interest 
in disclosing corruption. Instead, there is an entrenched expectation of holders of 
office enriching themselves that not even the most notorious cases raise an eyebrow 
anymore. Since civil society has been stifled by the NGO «foreign agent» reforms of 
2012 and media have been brought under more or less complete state control, there 
is hardly an independent channel left to survey United Russia’s pervasive influence 
over the country. As in the Soviet Union, anti-corruption is used as a tool for pre-
paring reshuffles of those in power. Armenia, by contrast, is run by a small clique of 
people with little popular legitimacy and, having sold out Armenia to the Eurasian 
Economic Union, with an increasing motivation to engage in rent-seeking while 
still in power. Azerbaijan, by contrast, is much less «in the pocket» of the Russian 
Federation, but pursuing its own authoritarian brand of politics with a rigorous 
suppression of civil society. Ukraine is perhaps the most problematic case. While 
the Euromaidan’s «Revolution of dignity» symbolised the desire to break free from 
post-Soviet traditions, the reality of engrained corruption, a catastrophic state of the 
economy and pervasive oligarchs controlling business is difficult to overcome. EU 
support policies focus on the issue of corruption, but it sometimes seems that the 
perception of a high level of corruption is self-serving, as the EU and its Member 
States are looking for reasons to shy away from the colossal task of restructuring 
the country.
1  See World Bank, Fighting Corruption in Public Services, Chronicling Georgia’s Reforms, The World 
Bank 2012. Also available at <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/518301468256183463/
pdf/664490PUB0EPI0065774B09780821394755.pdf>. Similar Christofer Berglund / Johan Engvall, 
How Georgia Stamped Out Corruption on Campus, Foreign Policy of 3 September 2015, available at 
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/03/how-georgia-stamped-out-corruption-on-campus/>.
2  See <https://fbk.info/english/about/>.
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Thus, boiling down the corruption situation in each country to one marker 
of perception is rather misleading. Perception is also not good at distinguishing 
between petty and grand corruption. When the fight against petty corruption in 
Georgia dominated the headlines, a lot of people were positively impressed. But they 
remained unaware of grand corruption which mostly took the form of nepotism and 
trading in influence. In other countries, there were similar success stories in fighting 
petty corruption, but the perception remained fixed on grand corruption. For exam-
ple, Belarus which ranks at # 79 in the CPI for 2016 is, by all impressions, corrup-
tion-free when it comes to the everyday experience of its citizens. This freedom from 
petty corruption is, of course, due to the threat of rigorous repression. Hence, the 
overall repressive nature of the Belarusian regime is much more strongly reflected 
in the perception-based ranking of the country. Similarly, Azerbaijan has employed 
technological advances like e-governance in a push to increase transparency and 
public accountability. And again, the semblance of a vigorous fight against corruption 
impacted much less on the perception of corruption than the overall neo-patrimonial 
approach of President Aliyev’s regime. 
Indeed, in a situation where most if not all countries of the Black Sea and Cau-
casus region(s) have ratified the major international anti-corruption conventions 
and submitted to monitoring and peer evaluation mechanisms like GRECO and 
others, there is a need to «show» progress, at least in areas which do not hurt the 
interests of those in power. Students of anti-corruption must be aware of the most 
important frameworks in international law and the state of the respective monitoring 
exercises. But looking at problems and gaps only from the perspective of a lack of 
implementation creates the wrong picture.1
Coming back to the idea of «fishing on Discovery Channel», if the analysis of cor-
ruption is to deliver a methodological basis for designing a regional anti-corruption ini-
tiative, it is necessary to look at the social construction of corruption and to understand 
why it is so engrained in the countries of the Black Sea and Caucaus region(s). This 
perspective is, of course, also not without problems. There is now a rich international 
debate on anti-corruption advances around the world,2 and prima facie there is not any 
reason to claim that corruption in the Black Sea and Caucasus regions(s) is just «so 
much more» engrained compared to Latin America, South East Asia, Southern Africa 
or the Arab world. Still, across all regional perspectives, there is a unifying consensus 
that anti-corruption is not about «rooting out an evil»,3 but about changing cultures.
1  An example of such a wrong perspective is Vahan Asatryan / Arpine Karapetyan / Arzu Abdullayeva 
/ Tamar Pataraia: State of the Fight Against Corruption in the South Caucasus, CASCADE European 
Policy Brief, August 2015, available at <http://www.cascade-caucasus.eu/en_GB/759>.
2  See for instance the very interesting overview of the Wilson Center, available at <http://pages.
wilsoncenter.org/index.php/email/emailWebview?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTURBek9HUTBZekJtWldW
ayIsInQiOiJZNmM5WFVGMjJKQW5kOFNMaXZDY0t6RndEdUF1OFpIY2ZjNmRjUDFpMW8
0R3dYaWpMSU5CT1FEQW1RUXM3ODN6ZW02MytRVG8zRVdSd1RjSGFLakt2RytDMmFD
WjdsTG9IWDg3ZW5hdDd4bz0ifQ%3D%3D> and the Global Anti-Corruption Blog, available at 
<https://globalanticorruptionblog.com>.
3  See, for example, the speech of Hillary Clinton on International Anti-Corruption Day 2009: <https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=nT4OKJ_4Wh0>.
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Very often, the root causes of corruption and the reasons for sluggish enforce-
ment, implementation problems and ominous gaps in legislation are the same. What 
is necessary therefore is to place corruption as well as the anti-corruption effort into 
the wider context of open government, a self-driven anti-corruption effort, public 
scrutiny through independent media and an active civil society, and finally an inde-
pendent judiciary. Changing a culture of corruption is possible! Adapting the legal 
framework and introducing best practices is needed, but instead of the now dominant 
«toolkit box approach» by which individual features prescribed by international law 
and supported by donors get introduced, implemented and evaluated, the anti-cor-
ruption effort needs to be built on incentives and the idea of «checks and balances». 
It is only when self-interest is harnessed that the incentives can be brought to bear 
for a real anti-corruption effort. 
In the public sphere, this idea is expressed by the requirement of an independent 
anti-corruption body1 that within government is exclusively tasked with bringing the 
anti-corruption agenda to the line ministries. There is a host of problems in achiev-
ing this goal and a large amount of literature now revolving around the question 
how such bodies, commonly called ACAs (anti-corruption agencies) can be made 
effective and prevented from capture by vested interests. Studying ACAs in compar-
ative perspective is therefore an important approach in designing an anti-corruption 
curriculum.
Self-interest can also be used in the private sector. In what originally is a 
U.S.-approach, the interest of a disgruntled bidder in a public auction or tender who 
believes to have been treated unfairly is a powerful tool to bring action, primarily 
through the courts. Art 1 of the Civil Law Convention against Corruption which has 
been widely ratified throughout the Black Sea and Caucaus region(s),2 expresses this 
idea more broadly.3 The effectiveness of this mechanism, however, critically hinges 
on two factors: openness of government and independence and integrity of courts.
Accessibility of information, accountability and transparency are key to prevent-
ing corruption in the public sphere. Many governments are purposefully hiding tax-
payers’ money in off-budget funds, public tenders get manipulated for private gain, 
and a host of administrative resources is brought to bear for the sake of private gain. 
When looking at the Black Sea and South Caucasus region(s), we see that currently 
levels of openness of government are quite varied. According to the World Justice 
Project’s Open Government Index 2015,4 out of 102 countries Georgia is ranked at 
# 29, Ukraine at # 43, Moldova at # 46, the Russian Federation at # 67 and Turkey 
1  Art 6 UNCAC. See additionally the Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies, 
available at <https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/WG-Prevention/Art_6_Preventive_
anti-corruption_bodies/JAKARTA_STATEMENT_en.pdf>.
2  The only country of the region which did not ratify the Convention is the Russian Federation.
3  Art. 1 „Each Party shall provide in its internal law for effective remedies for persons who have 
suffered damage as a result of acts of corruption, to enable them to defend their rights and interests, 
including the possibility of obtaining compensation for damage.“
4  Available at <http://worldjusticeproject.org/open-government-index/open-government-around-
world>.
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at # 82. There is no information available on Armenia and Azerbaijan. While these 
data need to be subject, of course, to rigourous examination, the question arises 
why prima facia Ukraine receives relatively good marks for openness of government 
while in the CPI it is described as one of the most corrupt countries in the region.
A truly independent judiciary which is neither open to government interven-
tions, «telephone justice» nor to bribery by the parties is still an elusive goal in most, 
if not all countries of the region. Integrity is a central value.1 When the courts are 
seen to be enforcing the law fairly, this creates a powerful incentive for individual 
parties to bring their complaints and drag into the open corruptive practices. A 
general impression of the current state of the independence of the judiciary in the 
Black Sea and Caucasus region(s) is offered by the Word Justice Project’s Rule of 
Law Index 2016.2 In a complex ranking that is based on 8 factors3 Georgia ranks 
# 34, Moldova # 77, Ukraine #78, Russia # 92 and Turkey # 99 out of 113 coun-
tries. Again, there is no information on Armenia and Azerbaijan, again the ranking 
of Ukraine seems rather benevolent.
Finally, self-interest can find its expression in the professional mission of inves-
tigative journalism and a critical civil society. Contrary to older international law 
conventions on anti-corruption, UNCAC in Art 13 explicitly recognises the «active 
participation of individuals and groups outside the public sector such as civil society, 
non-governmental organisations and community-based organisations.» Again, there is 
a host of literature on media’s and civil society’s4 role in anti-corruption. But when 
looking at the region(s) itself, it becomes clear that Western textbook approaches 
most often fail to recognise the complexities of the situation. The picture varies from 
repression of traditional NGOs to strong informal activities, especially driven by 
particular causes of popular discontent, to an overabundance of NGOs and a high 
donor-drivenness of civil society. Respected independent media with professional 
investigative journalism are rare if not absent, and most often it is committed indi-
viduals who use social media to bring public misconduct into the open. In general, 
independent media are not seen as the fourth estate as which they are commonly 
described in the West. Instead, the dominant perception is that of a «fifth column», 
1  The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2012) explicitly state: „3.2. The behaviour and 
conduct of a judge must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not 
merely be done but must also be seen to be done.“ Available at <https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/
corruption/judicial_group/Bangalore_principles.pdf>.
2  Available at <https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-
index-2016>.
3  (1) Constraints on Government Powers, (2) Absence of Corruption, (3) Open Government, (4) 
Fundamental Rights, (5) Order and Security, (6) Regulatory Enforcement, (7) Civil Justice and (8) 
Criminal Justice.
4  For further references, see in particular Indira Carr and Opi Outhwaite, The Role of Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) in Combating Corruption: Theory and Practice, Suffolk University Law 
Review XLIV: 3 (2011) 615-664, available at <https://www.academia.edu/1213559/The_role_
of_non-governmental_organisations_NGOs_in_combating_corruption_theory_and_practice and 
http://www.againstcorruption.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/WP-15-The-Experience-of-CS-as-
an-AC-actor-new.pdf>. 
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of muckrakers and troublemakers financed by foreign governments to undermine 
the state.
To summarize, in addressing the root causes of corruption in the region it is not 
sufficient to follow the UNODC’s «tool box approach» and introduce and implement 
singular features. The fight against corruption can only become sustainable when an 
incentive structure is put in place that allows individuals to pull corruption into the 
open. Ultimately, the fight against corruption cannot be waged in an isolated fashion, 
but it is part and parcel of what the EU’s external action today stands for: openness 
of government, support to civil society and independent media, independence of 
the judiciary. From this point of view, it is correct to see anti-corruption as part of 
the EU’s Europeanisation agenda. But it would be wrong to believe that this task 
can be discharged by simply referring to the relevant instruments of the Council of 
Europe, the OECD and, most importantly, UNCAC. Instead, the EU should focus 
its attention on the root causes of corruption and integrate the drive for anti-cor-
ruption into the general instruments of the ENP and EaP in the region(s). Unlike 
gender-mainstreaming which is an accepted EU policy approach, there is so far no 
anti-corruption mainstreaming in EU external action.1
Designing a curriculum for anti-corruption. The aforementioned Art 13 in 
para (1) lit c) UNCAC obliges State Parties to undertake «public information 
activities that contribute to non-tolerance of corruption, as well as public education 
programmes, including school and university curricula; (...)». So, for the first time 
governments across the world have entered into an obligation to introduce anti-cor-
ruption topics into university curricula. To achieve this goal, UNODC created a 
mechanism to bridge the gap between international organisations, governments and 
academia. The Anti-Corruption Academic Initiative (ACAD) was launched in Bos-
ton in May 2011 and is led by an expert group comprising a wide range of academics, 
governmental experts and officials from international organisations. Northeastern 
University along with the OECD and the International Bar Association (IBA) are 
supporting this project. 
Its most recent event was a symposium held on 30 and 31 October 2015 in co-op-
eration with the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and 
Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Centre (ROLACC), Doha / Qatar. Participants 
adopted a resolution which included, among others, the following recommendations:2
«The participants of the Symposium of the ACAD initiative:
Highlighting the importance of anti-corruption ethics and integrity training for 
all students, public officials and professionals, as recognized in article 13 of the UN 
Convention against Corruption;
1  By comparison, UNDP committed itself to mainstreaming anti-corruption in development 
work back in 2008. See the Anti-Corruption Practice Note of December 2008 “Mainstreaming 
Anti-Corruption in Development”, available at <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/
home/librarypage/democratic-governance/anti-corruption/mainstreaming-anti-corruption-in-
development.html>.
2  Available at <http://www.track.unodc.org/Education/Pages/ACAD.aspx>.
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Convinced of the important role of academia and education as an effective way 
to build integrity and to prevent and combat corruption using multidisciplinary and 
action learning approaches;
(…)
2. Recommend that academic institutions develop and teach anti-corruption 
courses and programmes for a wide range of disciplines and students and to integrate 
anti-corruption elements into other academic courses;
3. Encourage competent educational authorities to facilitate accreditation of 
anti-corruption courses;
4. Recommend that relevant national, regional, international and civil society 
organizations work with academia to support the teaching of anti-corruption and 
the dissemination and promotion of academic materials to the fullest extent possible.
(...)»
As part of its efforts to promote awareness of the principles of UNCAC, UNODC 
developed a full Academic Course on the Convention,1 looking at the issue of corrup-
tion from a local, national and global perspective. This Course has been delivered in 
a variety of universities across the world, and there has also been a pilot to deliver 
it via video-conference involving Washington & Lee University in the U.S. and the 
University of Liberia, with a Vienna-based UNODC official giving outlines to the 
respective UNCAC chapters.
Obviously, this UNODC Academic Course is perfectly fit to be delivered by 
universities in the Black Sea and Caucasus region(s), drawing on ACAD members 
as partners. But without under-estimating the usefulness of an UNCAC-centred 
course, the question remains whether this kind of approach would do justice to the 
specificities of the region(s). There are basically two concerns which come to mind:
While UNCAC prescriptions are legally binding in the countries concerned, 
there is the danger of «not seeing the forest for the trees». UNCAC codifies an 
anti-corruption tool kit that is based on the experience of various regional fora, and 
of course, it is valuable for every student to know about these instruments. But 
taken together with the widely overlapping monitoring exercises which focus on the 
implementation of one or the other feature, there is the danger that students do not 
get to the root causes why implementation in the region(s) is often tantamount to 
window-dressing for the international community. 
ACAD members represent a great variety of world-leading universities.2 Some 
of them like MGIMO are culturally close to the region(s), but delivery through an 
external partner from outside the region(s) will unavoidably result in a lack of con-
textualisation and the missed chance to create regional ownership in the teaching. 
Bringing a European-based anti-corruption curriculum based on European values can 
arguably done more profitably within the framework of the ENP and EaP, utilizing 
the EU’s presence in the region(s) on the ground.
1  See <http://www.track.unodc.org/Education/Pages/AcademicCourse.aspx>.
2  See the list of members at <http://www.track.unodc.org/Academia/Pages/Members.aspx>.
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Apart from these concerns, the UNCAC course’s mode of delivery does not 
incorporate new tools for e-learning and virtual classroom experiences that have 
come into existence during recent years and which, if suitably integrated, are capable 
of enhancing the learning experience of students. Indeed, if only to summarize the 
latest developments in anti-corruption e-learning tools, there is now a large variety 
of e-learning tools available free of charge. There are different techniques of delivery 
while substance ranges from a beginner’s level to advanced issues.
The E-Learning Platform for Neighbourhood1 is the youngest member of the 
«family», commissioned by the EU and implemented by the College of Europe. It 
came into existence only in March 2016. While covering basics on anti-corruption 
and thus being suitable for beginners, the style of delivery is rather disappointing. 
For the anti-corruption class there is a split-screen with an actor / talking head left 
and a powerpoint presentation right. Interactive elements are limited to multiple 
choice testing at mid-level and at the end.
UNODC offers its e-learning platform goLearn2 on a large variety of topics 
including anti-corruption to officials from member states, international organisations, 
and other UN agencies and UNODC partners. However, it is possible to obtain 
from UNODC an individual student access for learning purposes. Content-wise, 
the material on anti-corruption is structured into one presentation for beginners 
and one for advanced listeners. The mode of delivery is unfortunately very close to 
a presentation, with interspersed videos and multiple choice testing.
The most exciting and well-done e-learning platform on anti-corruption is 
undoubtedly the one developed by UNODC with the UN Global Compact.3 It is 
called «The Fight against Corruption» and focuses on the private sector and com-
pliance developments as they are enshrined in Principle 10 of the UN Global Com-
pact.4 The mode of delivery is actor-based and interactive. Through a series of scenes 
involving corrupt behaviour in business the student is asked to get involved in the 
actor’s situation and advise him or her on doing the right thing. In addition, there is 
a host who neatly captures the main learning outcomes and puts them into context. 
Also extremely well-done is an online training course hosted on Anti-Corruption 
Authorities,5 a platform created by the World Bank in collaboration with UNODC, 
the US State Department and the European Commission. Contrary to all the afore-
mentioned tools, this training course is tailored to anti-corruption and governance 
practitioners.6 It invites the user to take part in the secondment of a member of the 
fictitious Exlandia Donor Consultation Group to the capital of Exlandia. The Prime 
Minister of Exlandia has requested the advice of the Donor Consultation Group 
on the feasibility of establishing an anti-corruption authority, and this fact-finding 
1 See <http://www.euforneighbourhood.eu/>.
2 See <https://golearn.unodc.org>.
3 See <http://thefightagainstcorruption.org/certificate/login/index.php>.
4 „Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.“
5 See <www.acauthorities.org>.
6 See <https://www.acauthorities.org/content/anti-corruption-authorities-online-training-course>.
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mission into the situation in Exlandia becomes some kind of stress test for the entire 
Donor Consultation Group.
Didactically speaking, the problem with all these e-learning tools is that they 
present a stand-alone teaching that offers at best a certificate to the successful par-
ticipant. Including them into a face-to-face classroom situation is the solution which 
should create a win-win situation both for students and for universities who want 
to offer anti-corruption classes without assuming the cost of fly-in faculty. If, on 
the other hand, we accept that even a blended learning-experience is impossible to 
organise due to financial constraints, there are still the MOOCs that were mentioned 
previously. How do they differ from the e-learning tools outlined above? 
A MOOC is practically an advanced version of a standard e-learning platform. 
The major difference is the element of time and organisation. While self-paced 
MOOCs are similar to classical e-learning platforms in that they offer the participant 
the chance to learn whenever and wherever, the more ambitious category of mod-
erated MOOCs is one that is offered only for a specific time period. For this given 
time (usually several weeks) a cohort of participants is formed that goes through the 
various modules together and engages in online discussions with each other and the 
MOOC moderator. Some MOOCs can have thousands of participants at the same 
time so that the discussions can become truly «massive”. MOOCs are usually free of 
charge, however for exams and the final certificate a fee may be charged. Although 
MOOCs are developed by individual scholars on behalf of their universities, they 
enter the market place usually on the platform of one or the other private company. 
Most well-known are the U.S.-based Coursera1 and Canvas2 platforms, but there 
are also the originally Turkish Udemy,3 the German Iversity4 as well as many others 
with a variety of different business models (e.g. edX,5 Futurelearn,6 Lynda,7 Saylor8 
and Udacity9). Each platform has its own quality requirements and the developers 
of a MOOC usually have to apply to the platform in order to obtain admission.
To get an overview of the MOOCs currently offered, it is advisable to consult 
the course catalogues of the respective platforms or to use specialised search engines 
such as <www.mooc-list.com> and <www.edukatico.org>. At the time of writing 
(June 2017), MOOCs offered in the field of «corruption” were still quite scarce. 
Only Coursera had two relevant suggestions: one course offered by the University 
of Pennsylvania was a moderated MOOC on the topic of «Corruption”, addressing 
basically bachelor students. A second, also moderated, MOOC was offered by the 
University of Lausanne on the topic «Unethical Decision-making in Organizations”. 
1 See <www.coursera.org>.
2 See <https://canvas.instructure.com>.
3 See <www.udemy.com>.
4 See <https://iversity.org>.
5 See <www.edx.org>.
6 See <www.futurelearn.com>.
7 See <www.lynda.com>.
8 See <www.saylor.org>.
9 See <www.udacity.com>.
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The way forward. It is difficult to suggest a «one size fits all” model on how 
to bring anti-corruption education to the Black Sea and Caucasus region(s). Most 
universities are still very slow to develop attractive new curricula. While the idea 
of a Master in Anti-Corruption Studies, as is currently offered by the International 
Anti-Corruption Academy in Laxenburg (Austria),1 is elusive for most if not all, 
some interim solutions using online tools are quite feasible. As a rule, students are 
eager to learn about corruption and integrity issues, but only very few have the 
stamina to go through online training opportunities by themselves. Therefore, any 
way of integrating this dynamic field of online resources in anti-corruption studies 
into university teaching is welcome.
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Питання антикорупційної освіти в Кавказькому та Чорноморському регіонах
Розглянуто питання організації антикорупційної освіти в державах Чорноморського і Кавказь-
кого регіонів. Аргументовано, що використання електронних ресурсів, зокрема методу «універсаль-
ної інструментальної системи», схваленого Офісом ООН із боротьби з наркотиками і злочинністю, 
недостатньо для викорінення причин корупції в цих регіонах. Як альтернативу, запропоновано 
інтенсифікувати антикорупційну освіту в контексті європейської політики добросусідства і 
зокрема Східного партнерства. Це передбачає обов'язкову підтримку з боку громадянського 
суспільства, незалежних засобів масової інформації, а також незалежність і взаємодію судових 
та урядових органів.
Ключові слова: антикорупційна освіта; громадянське суспільство; професійна етика; відкри-
тий уряд; європейська політика добросусідства.
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